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 RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 3458
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6793
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE 4576
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0449
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 8503
 RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 3187
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DEPARTMENT FOR A/S CROCKER AND DAS WISNER

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PNAT, MZ, SF, TZ, WA, ZI, AO, BC
 SUBJECT: THE MARCH 8 LUSAKA FRONT LINE SUMMIT

REF: LUSAKA 1168 (NOTAL)

1. (S) BBC REPORTER MARTIN LUMB (PROTECT) TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD MET WITH KAUNDA'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PRESS AFFAIRS, MILIMO PUNABANTU ON MARCH 9. PUNABANTU TOLD LUMB THAT ABOUT HALF THE FLS MEETING WAS TAKEN UP BY MOZAMBIKAN PRESIDENT MACHEL'S DISCOURSE ON THE FAILINGS OF THE NKOMATI AGREEMENT. MACHEL REPORTEDLY TOLD THE MEETING THAT HE HAD BEEN SOLD A LEMON BECAUSE THE SAG WAS NOT LIVING UP TO ITS END OF THE BARGAIN. MACHEL ALSO STATED THAT BECAUSE OF GPRM SECURITY CONCERNS, MOZAMBIQUE IS GOING TO GET A BIG EQUIPMENT BUILD-UP FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE DELIVERIES SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS. PUNABANTU TOLD LUMB THAT THE GPRM DOES NOT PLAN TO GO BACK ON ITS PART OF NKOMATI (I.E., MOZAMBIQUE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THE ANC UNDER CONTROL). MACHEL REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE USG HAD NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE SAG TO HONOR NKOMATI.

2. (C) ACCORDING TO SOME LOCAL CONTACTS WITH GOOD SWAPO TIES, SAM NUJOMA WAS PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE MARCH 8 MEETING WENT, BUT THEY NOTED THAT THE SUMMIT HAD FOCUSED MAINLY ON NKOMATI AND HAD MADE ONLY

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PAGE 002

NC 6685139

TOR: 111012Z MAR 85

THE USUAL REFERENCES TO SUPPORT FOR SWAPO. NUJOMA
LEFT LUSAKA ON MARCH 9 FOR A VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. HILL
END OF MESSAGE

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INFO RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 2469
RUFHOR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 2588
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 1650
RUFHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 3312
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3185
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CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: O43), PINT, MZ, SF, US
SUBJECT: MACHEL ON NKOMATI

REF: STATE 68793 (NOTAL)

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY - PRESIDENT MACHEL CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE FOR SEVERAL HOURS SHORTLY BEFORE DEPARTING FOR HARARE TO TOUCH BASE WITH MUGABE ENROUTE TO THE FLS SUMMIT IN LUSAKA. HE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME TELLING ME A) THAT THE NKOMATI PROCESS HAD NOT WORKED, B) THAT THE GPRM HAD LOST ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE SAG C) THAT THE GPRM WOULD NOT SHARE POWER WITH THE " ARMED BANDITS" D) HE WAS PURSUING A MILITARY OPTION AGAINST THE " BANDITS" AND E) HE GREATLY VALUED THE U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

3. MACHEL CALLED ME TO SEE HIM BEFORE HE LEFT FOR HARARE TO CONSULT WITH MUGABE PRIOR TO THE FLS SUMMIT IN LUSAKA TOMORROW. HE WAS IN FINE FETTER AND GREETED ME WARMLY. OUR MEETING LASTED SEVERAL HOURS. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FERNANDO HONWANA AND HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY (MURADALI) WERE ALSO PRESENT. IT SEEMED THAT THE SERIES OF JUST- CONCLUDED POLITICAL MEETINGS THE PAST TWO WEEKS (POLITICAL BUREAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY) HAD ENDORSED HIS DECISION TO PURSUE A TWO TRACK OPTION OF KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN TO THE NKOMATI PROCESS WHILE REINVIGORATING THE MILITARY OPTION AGAINST RENAMO. THIS BACKING BY HIS COLLEAGUES APPEARS TO HAVE LIFTED THE TENSION OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS FROM MACHEL'S SHOULDERS -- HE WAS VISIBLY RELIEVED AND HAD REVERTED TO HIS FORMER

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PAGE 002

NC 6670619

TOR: 082142Z MAR 85

CONFIDENT, JOVIAL SELF.

4. A WEEK HENCE, SAID MACHEL, WOULD BE THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD SIGNING. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE AFTER HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN A CEREMONY OF SORTS BUT HE WOULD NOT. WHAT WOULD HIS PEOPLE THINK, HE ASKED, IF HE WERE TO ACCEPT? THE PRESIDENT THEN LAUNCHED INTO THE NOW FAMILIAR LITANY AGAINST THE SAG WITH A REFRAIN OR TWO FOR THE PORTUGUESE. ACCUSING IT OF NOT ADHERING TO THE NKOMATI ACCORD. THE SAG HAD TRIED TO TOPPLE HIM OVERTLY AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND HAD FAILED. IT WAS TRYING TO OUST HIM BY INTERNAL DESTABILIZATION THROUGH FORCING HIM TO NEGOTIATE POWER-SHARING WITH THE "ARMED BANDITS" THIS TOO WOULD FAIL. FRELIMO WOULD NEVER AGREE TO SUCH A MOVE HE INSISTED. NOR WOULD IT NEGOTIATE A SECOND INDEPENDENCE AGREEMENT WITH THE PORTUGUESE (REFERRING TO THE PORTUGUESE COMPONENT OF RENAMO).

5. HE HAD TOTALLY LOST ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE SAG. HE TOLD ME, BECAUSE A YEAR AFTER THE NKOMATI TREATY, THE SAG CONTINUED TO GIVE AID TO THE "BANDITS." WHEN I ASKED ABOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION HE PROMISED TO PROVIDE PROOF, SAYING THE GPRM HAD IT AS DID THE SAG BUT THAT THE LATTER REFUSED TO ACT TO SHUT OFF THE "BANDITS" OSTENSIBLY, THE DOOR REMAINED OPEN FOR SAG EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, BUT IT WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE THE SAG DID NOT WANT TO END THE CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE. MACHEL NOTED THAT THE GPRM WOULD NOT RENEGE ON ITS OWN COMMITMENTS AT NKOMATI, NEVERTHELESS, IT HAD TO TAKE STEPS TO DEFEND ITSELF.

6. BECOMING QUIETLY SERIOUS, MACHEL INFORMED ME THAT, IN VIEW OF THE PAST YEAR, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PRESSING AHEAD WITH THE MILITARY OPTION. AGAINST ITS WISH, THE GPRM WOULD NOW "ARM" THE PEOPLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. IT WOULD TURN TO WHATEVER NECESSARY TO OBTAIN HELP. HE UNDERScoreD THIS POLICY DID NOT SIGNIFY HE WAS INTRODUCING THE DIMENSION OF THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT INTO MOZAMBIQUE. HE WANTED ME TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ON THAT POINT, HE ADDED, BUT STRESSED THAT HE COULD NOT STAND BY IDLY WHILE THE "BANDITS" CONTINUED TO SCOURGE THE LAND. HE WOULD PROTECT HIS PEOPLE FROM RAPE, MURDER, AND PILLAGE. HE WOULD DEFEND HIS NATION'S RESOURCES FROM THE ECONOMIC WARFARE BEING WAGED BY THE ENEMY. I ASKED MACHEL FOR MORE SPECIFICS. HE REPLIED HE WAS ON THE WAY FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES. THE SOVIET BLOC REMAINS A PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF MILITARY

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CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12356 §3: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, MZ, SF, US
SUBJECT: MACHEL ON NKOMATI

ARMS, BUT THERE WERE OTHERS AS WELL. THUS THE LUSOPHONE DECLARATION AT THE SAO TOME SUMMIT ASKING FOR "MEANS AND FORCES" FROM ALL SOURCES -- AND THUS THE UPCOMING FLS SUMMIT IN LUSAKA. AFRICANS WERE BEING ASKED TO HELP AS WAS THE PRC, SEVERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. HE DID NOT WANT FOREIGN TROOPS NOW, BUT WOULD NOT HESITATE IF AS A LAST RESORT IT BECAME NECESSARY. BOTH LIGHT AND HEAVY ARMS ARE ESSENTIAL TO CARRY THE BATTLE TO THE "BANDITS" AND WIN. HE WAS NOT PREDICTING A VICTORY DATE. BUT THE ENEMY HAD NO POLITICAL BASE WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD EVENTUALLY LOSE, EVEN WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AND PORTUGUESE SUPPORT.

7. THROUGHOUT OUR MEETING, PRESIDENT MACHEL WAS CAREFUL TO

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PAGE 003

NC 6670619

TOR: 082142Z MAR 85

UNDERScore HIS GENUINE APPRECIATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. OUR HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT WAS GREATLY VALUED. BUT THE NEW ECONOMIC AND NEW MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAD BECOME PARTICULARLY WELCOME AS A SIGNIFICANT JUNCTURE IN POST- INDEPENDENCE MOZAMBIQUE.

WITH REGARD TO THE CURRENT IMET/MAP NEGOTIATIONS, HE EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION ON THE MOZAMBIKAN SIDE. READILY ACCEPTING AND UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR AMERICAN " NON- LETHAL" AID, HE NEVERTHELESS POINTED OUT THAT HE ALSO NEEDED LETHAL WEAPONS TO STOP THE " BANDITS. THE USG MUST COMPREHEND FULLY WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH AND HE HOPED WOULD NOT VIEW HIS EFFORTS THROUGH AN INCORRECT OPTIC. HE INSISTED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE SAG TO LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS LEFT HIM NO ALTERNATIVE. I ANSWERED THAT I WANTED THERE TO BE NO DOUBT LEFT IN HIS OR ANYONE ELSE'S MIND AS TO THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FOR PRESIDENT MACHEL: AT THE SAME TIME, I WARNED, THERE WERE CRITICS IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE WHO WOULD BE WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS CAREFULLY AND QUICK TO ACCUSE FRELIMO OF BEING A SOVIET SYNCOPHANT.

8. MACHEL ALSO RAISED PIK BOTHA' S PROPOSALS TO VIEIRA AND THE IDEA OF A TRILATERAL COMMISSION (INCLUDING THE U.S.) TO VERIFY ALLEGATIONS OF NKOMATI VIOLATIONS. THEY WERE NON- STARTES, HE STATED CAUTIONING THE U.S. TO STAY AWAY FROM SUCH AN OFFER. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MADE RENAMO WHAT IT IS AND CAN HALT IT ON THEIR OWN IF THEY WERE SO INCLINED. " STAY OUT OF THEIR -----!" HE WARNED IN CATEGORIC TERMS.

9. COMMENT. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY EROSION OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GPRM TO RELY ON THE SAG TO BRING THE PEACE. ESPECIALLY SINCE THE RENAMO WALKOUT IN OCTOBER. IT WAS A REAL BLOW TO THE FRELIMO LEADERSHIP WHICH UP TO THAT POINT HAD STEADFASTLY RESISTED CRITICISM AND BLANDISHMENTS TO DITCH NKOMATI. THE MOZAMBIKANS APPEAR NO LONGER TO HAVE FAITH IN THE SAG'S GOOD INTENTIONS, AND ARE NOW SEEKING TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN BARGAINING POSITION THROUGH ENHANCING THEIR MILITARY SITUATION. THE GPRM WILL NOT OUTRIGHT FORECLOSE THE NKOMATI OPTION, BUT THE PRESENT FOCUS IS ON GAINING MILITARY PROWESS. THE RESULTS OF THE PAST YEAR CONFIRM IN FRELIMO'S MIND THE CORRECTNESS OF ITS SHIFT. AFTER A PERIOD OF GREAT HOPE WHEN MAPUTO GENUINELY SOUGHT TO COLLABORATE WITH THE SAG (IN FACT THERE HAVE BEEN NO CHARGES THAT THE GPRM HAS VIOLATED NKOMATI), THE CONTINUED INSURGENCY HAD THE APPARENT UNRESPONSIVENESS OF THE SAG HAS BADLY DEBILITATED THE NKOMATI PROCESS. MOREOVER , SINCE DECEMBER THE FPLM BELIEVES IT HAS BEEN ON THE OFFENSIVE IN A FEW AREAS (INCLUDING MAPUTO PROVINCE) AND IS BEGINNING TO REGAIN SOME CONFIDENCE. THE POLITICAL BUREAU ET ALIA HAS ALSO BOLSTERED FRELIMO SPIRITS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE TYPE OF OPTIONS WE DISCUSSED DURING RECENT CROCKER AND WISNER MISSIONS MAY BE RAPIDLY PASSING. WHAT MAY WELL BE REQUIRED NOW IS A UNILATERAL STEP(S) BY THE SAG WHICH IS TANGIBLE AND VISIBLE TO MACHEL AND COLLEAGUES. NKOMATI IS NOT NECESSARILY FINISHED, NOR IS IT LIKELY TO BE FORMALLY DROPPED BY THE GPRM UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT FURTHER INITIATIVES ARE CLEARLY REQUIRED IN PRETORIA/ CAPE TOWN. U.S. EFFORTS SHOULD BE GEARED TO CONTINUED ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR MACHEL WHILE ENCOURAGING THE SAG TO COME UP WITH SOMETHING MEANINGFUL. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS EMANATING FROM PRETORIA OF STEPS AGAINST RENAMO WHICH DO NOT PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS WILL BE INSUFFICIENT TO REENGAGE THE GPRM. A GENUINE MOVE AGAINST RENAMO SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE REPUBLIC COULD BE ONE ACT OF STEERING THE SLIDE. IN THE INTERIM, IT IS WORTH KEEPING IN MIND THAT OUR

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TOR: 082142Z MAR 85

BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO LOURISH.
DE VOS

END OF MESSAGE

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